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I. INTRODUCTION

Detecting those who engage in the practice of defrauding the United States
Government is generally hard for Government investigators, as outsiders.1
Concurrently, those on the inside are reluctant to report Government fraud
because they are benefitting from the fraud, unwilling to report superiors or
co-workers, or they believe that disclosure would not bring results. 2 In an effort
to decrease instances of the Government being defrauded, Congress has
resurrected an old statute, enacted after the Civil War.3 The original intent of
the statute was to ferret out and combat fraud among Civil War defense
contracts. 4 The statute, in its current form, was amended in 1986. Congress
loosened restrictions on the use of the statute and, in effect created a powerful
tool that enables the private sector to help the Government (and ultimately
themselves as taxpayers) combat fraud committed against the Government. 5
The Federal False Claims Act, (hereinafter the FCA) allows the Government
to sue an individual who has knowingly submitted a false claim to the
Government for return of the money.6 The qui tam provision of this act allows
a private individual, commonly referred to as a relator (one who relates
information to the Government), 7 to bring suit on behalf of the Government
against a person in violation of the FCA.8 In other words, the statute allows the
relator to act as a temporary attorney general and prosecute a claim on behalf
of the Government. If the case is successful, the relator gets a percentage of the
money returned to the United States Treasury, in addition to reasonable
attorney's fees. 9
Although the original purpose of the statute was to combat defense fraud,
the 1986 amendments create incentives and give relators power to bring qui tam
actions in response to fraud in other areas of Government spending. A logical
step beyond defense is Medicare/Medicaid; the second largest area of
1

The Economic Crime Council has been trying to discern through hearings why

fraud in government programs is so "pervasive yet seldom detected and rarely
prosecuted ....Detecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of
individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent
activity." This problem is referred to by Congress as the "Conspiracy of Silence." S. REP.
No. 345,99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1985), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,5269, 5271.
2

1d. at 5269-70.

3

1d. at 5273.

4

1d.

5

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.S. § 3729-3731 (Law Co-op. 1993).

6§ 3729(a)(1-7).
7

"An informer, the person upon whose complaint, or at whose insistence certain
writs are issued.., and who is quasi the plaintiff in the proceeding." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1159 (5th ed. 1979).
8§ 3730(bl)(1).
9§ 3730(d).
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Government spending and one of the only areas where Government spending
is increasing.10
Unlike the defense industry (which has relatively little contact with the
general public), the health care industry, as a service industry, is largely reliant
on the general public. A lawsuit involving fraud in health care threatens to
harm the public's opinion of the health care industry. For this reason, the qui
tam provisions of the FCA are in a unique position to generate action and
changes and have a substantial impact on the health care industry. This note
will discuss the history of the qui tam element of the FCA; a breakdown of the
statute; areas in the new amendments that are encouraging relators to come
forward with information; its application to health care; and the positive and
negative impact the act stands to have on the health care industry.
II. HISTORY OF THE STATUTE
Qui tam actions date back to English common laws. The term qui tam is an
abbreviation of the latin qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequiturwhich means "who brings action for the king as well as himself."11 The
United States Congress included a qui tam provision in the False Claims Act.
The False Claims Act was enacted in 1863 to deal with fraud against the U.S.
Defense Department committed by defense contractors during the U.S. Civil
War.12 Commonly referred to as the Lincoln law, the qui tam provision allowed
any person to prosecute a claim on behalf of the United States against any
13
person who knowingly submitted a false claim to the Government. If
successful, the relator was entitled to one half of the amount the government
recovered. 14
The statute went through a period of relative inactivity from the late 1800's
until the 1940's. In the 1940's the statute went through a series of interpretations
by the courts and ajustments to the statute by Congress in response to those
interpretations.
In the 1940's, people began to simply copy information out of Government
indictments and sue under the qui tam provision of the False Claims Act. 15 This
type of lawsuit was commonly referred to as a parasitic lawsuit because the

10

"In 1984, the Economic Crime Council of the Department of Justice targeted two

major federal programs-defense procurement and health care benefits-as economic
crime areas which stronger enforcement and deterrence was needed." S. REP. No. 345,
supranote 1, at 4, reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269.
11
See W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 160 (1768).
12See S. REP. No. 345, 99th Congress, 2d Sess. 8-10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5273-75.
13
1d. at 5275.
14
5

See Act of March 2, 1863, Ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.

1 United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Insurance, 944 F.2d 1149, 1153 (3d Cir.
1991).
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individual simply copied the information previously made public by the

Government. 16 Parasitic law suits exploited the qui tam provision, not helping
the Attorney General's office combat fraud or provide a deterrent to the
commission of fraud, but instead created a "race to the courthouse" between
Government attorneys and the private relator in order to file the actions and
recoup the Government's losses.1 7 Relators were receiving a percentage of the
Government's recovery and reasonable attorney's fees without providing any
new information to the case or helping the Government break the "conspiracies
of silence" surrounding Government fraud. 18 In Marcus v. Hess, the United
States Supreme Court held that this type of suit was legal under the statute.1 9
In response to Marcus, Congress amended the statute, reflecting that the
intent of the act was not to encourage parasitic lawsuits, but instead, for relators
to provide the Government with new information regarding false claims. 20 The
1943 amendments to the FCA denied jurisdiction for qui tam actions that were
based on evidence or information that the Government already possessed
21
when the action was brought.
In response to the 1943 amendments, courts barred jurisdiction whenever
the Government possessed the information concerning the fraud on which the
claim was brought-even when the information had been provided to the
Government by the qui tam plaintiff before the filing of the claim.22 In the 1983
case of Wisconsin v. Dean, the Court refused jurisdiction over a qui tam action
brought by the State of Wisconsin because the state itself reported the fraud to
the Government as required under the Act.23 As exhibited by Congress' actions
discussed infra, this was not the intent of that Act either.
Wisconsin v. Dean attracted quite a bit of negative attention. The National
Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution strongly urging
Congress to rectify the unfortunate result of Wisconsin v. Dean, calling it "an
24
unnecessary inhibitor to the detection of fraud on the Government."
16
Kenneth D. Broody, Recent Developments in the Area of "Qui Tam" Lawsuits: A new
weaponfor challengingthose who may be submittingfalse claims to the government, 37 FED. B.
NEWS & J 592, 593 (1990).
17

1d.

18Id.
19 Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943) (a relator can bring a qui tam action based solely
on information derived from a government criminal indictment).
20

prudential,944 F.2d at 1153.

21

The 1943 amendments denied jurisdiction over qui tam actions thatwere "ased on
evidence or information the government had when the action was brought." 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(b)(4)(1982) (superseded).
22
23

prudential,944 F.2d at 1153, 1154.

Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court has no jurisdiction
over a qui tam action brought by Wisconsin based on information of Medicaid fraud the
state had uncovered because the state had reported the Medicaid fraud to the Federal
Government as required under the Act).

1994-95]

FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT

Concurrently, Congress was being frequently embarrassed by press accounts
during the 1980's exposing Government waste while the national debt was
continuing to grow.25 Examples included paying defense contractors over $500
apiece for coffee pots, tools and toilet seats.26 Members of Congress began
actively looking for ways to halt Government fraud. The old, "crippled" law
was stumbled upon by the Co-director of the Center for Law and Public
Interest, John Phillips, who recognized the potential it had for decreasing
27
Government defraudment and providing revenue for public interest work.
After further inquiry, the Center for Law and Public Interest sent a series of
proposed amendments to Senator Charles Grassley and Congressman Howard
Berman. 28 "For the next two years this unlikely duo of a liberal Democratic
Congressman and a conservative Republican Senator skillfully guided the
amendments through Congress. ' 9 The amendments passed by wide margins
in both the Senate and the House. 30 Despite a last minute attempt by defense
contractors to kill the bill, it was signed into law by President Reagan the last
31
day before a pocket veto would have taken effect.
In encouraging members of Congress to amend the statute, statements made
by Senator Grassley seemed to accurately reflect the intent of Congress "to
resolve the tension between ...encouraging and preventing parasitic
lawsuits."32 Congress saw the Act as a way to stop the "conspiracy of silence
among employees of corporations engaging in fraud by enlisting the
cooperation of those individuals who are either close observers or otherwise
involved in fraudulent activity."33

24prudent/a/, 944 F.2d at 1154.
25
See John R. Phillips, Qui tam Litigation:A new forum for prosecuting False Claims
against the Government, American College of Legal Medicine, Symposium on Qui Tam

litigation,14 J. LEGAL MED. 267, at 267 (June 1993).
26
1d. at 268.
27

"It became immediately evident that this law offered both the potential to do
interesting and important public interest work-ferreting out fraud against the

Government-while at the same time providing a new and much needed source of
revenue to fund future public interest litigation." Id.at 269.
28
1d.at 268.
29
Phillips, supranote 25, at 269.
30

1d. at 269.
1d. at 270.

31
32

prudential,944 F.2d at 1154.

33

1d.
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III. BREAKDOWN OF THE STATUTE
A. § 3729 False Claims34
1. The Elements
In order to establish the elements of a false claim under the FCA, the relator
must prove that the defendant presented a claim to the Government, that the
claim was false or fraudulent and that the defendant had knowledge that the
claim was false. 35 The statute defines a "claim" as:
any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for
money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other
recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the
money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the
Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient
for any portion
of the money or property which is requested or
36
demanded.
"Knowingly" according to the statute means that a person, with respect to
information(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information; or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth of falsity of 37the
information, and no proof of specific intent is required.
This definition of the knowledge element in the current version of the statute
is significantly different from the previous version. Under the former statute,
a relator had to prove actual knowledge. 3 8 The more liberal post-1986 version
is more expansive. By not requiring specific intent or actual knowledge but
instead requiring "reckless disregard" or "deliberate ignorance" of the
information, the statute extends liability to virtually anybody involved with
the claim to make sure there has been no mistake or fraud.39 Under the new
knowledge requirement, it would be unwise for one to sign a claim without
knowing that it was a correct and accurate statement of the goods or services
provided to the Government. Additionally, supervisors and administrators

3431 U.S.C.S. §§ 3729-3733 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
3531 U.S.C.S. § 3729 (a)(1-7) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
36§ 3729(c).
37§ 3729(b).
38
Laurence H. Reece Ill, Whistleblower Suits Fertile Field for Litigators; Federal False
Claims Acts, MASSACHussETrs LAWYERS WEEKLY 42, Sept. 20, 1993; "Prior to the 1986
amendments the FCA included a single intent standard: actual knowledge of falsity."
United States v. Data Translation, Inc., 984 F.2d 1256,1266 (1st Cir. 1992).
3931 U.S.C.S. § 3729(c) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
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may no longer "look the other way" or simply avoid involvement with the
processing of the claims. Data entry and clerical employees should feel
compelled to question any claims that do not appear correct or else they too,
may face liability under the statute. It appears from the new construction of the
knowledge element Congress is holding employees at all levels of companies
receiving government money responsible.
2. Damages
If the relator proves that the defendant presented a claim to the Government,
that the claim was false or fraudulent, and the defendant had knowledge that
the claim was false, the statute sets forth the following penalty that the
defendant "is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not
less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times the amount of
damages which the Government sustains because of the act of that person
"40

It is important to note that the damages are now structured to make litigation
worthwhile for the plaintiff. If the defendant has made only one or a few claims,
but they are of large amounts, the damages portion of the statue which requires
the defendant to pay three times the amount of the fraudulent claim has some
bite.41 If the defendant has regularly made a great number of claims for small
dollar amounts, the civil penalty of not less than $5,000 per claim makes it
financially worthwhile for the plaintiff to bring a suit.4 2
B. § 3730 Civil Actions for False Claims
1. The Qui Tam Provision
The qui tam provision allows for an individual to sue, on behalf of the
Government, a person whom the relator knows to have violated § 3729.43 "A
person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person
and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name
of the Government . "44
To start a qui tam action, the private plaintiff must first file a complaint with
the Government. 45 It is kept under seal for 60 days, without being served upon

40§ 3729(a).
4

lid.

42

Even if each false claim is only for a small amount, with a civil penalty of up to
$10,000, if there have been enough false claims submitted, it would be worthwhile for
a relator to bring an action for small, repeated claims. Robert Vogel, Invasion of the Bounty
Hunters,LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1992 at 14.
4331 U.S.C.S. § 3730 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
44§ 3729(b).
45§ 3730(b)(2).
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the defendant, to allow the Government to investigate the allegations. 46 This
permits the Government to investigate the claim without the defendant's
47
knowledge and at the same time protect the defendant from false allegations.
After the 60 days, 48 the Government must either proceed with the case or
49
notify the jurisdictional court that it declines to take the action any further. If
the Government proceeds, it has primary responsibility in the action, but the
plaintiff has the right to continue as a party to the action.5 0 If the Government
proceeds and wins the action, the plaintiff is entitled to at least fifteen percent
5
and up to twenty five percent of the recovery. 1
If the Government does not take over the case and the private plaintiff
proceeds alone,
the person bringing the action or settling the claim shall receive an
amount which the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil
penalty and damages. The amount shall be not less than 25 percent and
not more than 30 percent of the proceeds
of the action or settlement
52
and shall be paid out of such proceeds.
Additionally, if the plaintiff is successful, he or she receives reimbursement for
reasonably incurred expenses, attorney's fees and costs.5 3 However,
[I]f the government does not proceed with the action,... the court may
award to the defendant its reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses if
the defendant prevails in the action and the court finds that the claim
of person bringing the action was clearly frivolous4 clearly vexatious,
or brought primarily for purposes of harassment.

46§ 3730(b)(2).
47

See Reece, supra note 38, at 42.

48

The Government can have this time period extended upon a motion to the court if
good cause is shown. Such motions mustbe in theform of affidavits or other submissions
in camera. 31 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
4930 U.S.C.S. § 3730(b)(4)(A-B) (Law. Co-op. 1993).

50§ 3730(b)(4); However, the qui tam plaintiff's rights to continue the action are
subject to § 3730(c)(2)(A) "The Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the
objections of the person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the
Government of the filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an
opportunity to be heard." Id.
5131 U.S.C.S. § 3730(d)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
52§ 3730(d)(2).
53§ 3730(d)(1)-(2).
54§ 3730(d)(4).
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2. Bars to Action
Although the 1986 version of the statute intended to make it easier for
relators to bring an action, there are still several strong bars to action in the
statute. A plaintiff may not bring an action based on "allegations or transactions
which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty
proceeding in which the Government is already a party."55 Also, the court shall
have no jurisdiction over an action based on ".

.

. public disclosure of

allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil or administrative hearing,.., or
Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from
or the
the news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General,
56
person bringing the action is an original source of the information."
Original source is defined by the statute as an "individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which allegations are based and
has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing an
action under this section which is based on the information." 57 These bars are
reflective of Congress' desire to avoid the "parasitic lawsuits" that provoked
the 1943 amendments.
3. Whistleblower Protection
The current statute provides protection for relators who bring actions against
their employers:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened,
harassed, or in any other manner discriminated against in the terms
and conditions of employment by his or her employer because of
lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others
in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation
for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be
necessary to make
filed under this section,
58 shall be entitled to all relief
the employee whole.
Whistleblower protection contributes significantly toward achieving the
congressional desire to encourage those within the "conspiracy of silence" to
come forward with information concerning false claims. 59
The result is a powerful statute with multiple rewards. The Governmentgets
the option of taking over the action with a key witness as a co-plaintiff, or taking
a back seat and simply observing-either way getting the majority of the

55§ 3730(e)(3).
56§ 3730(e)(4)(A).
57§ 3730(e)(4) (B).
58§ 3730(h).
59S. REP. No. 345, supranote 1, at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271.
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recovery.60 Instead of adding detectives and law enforcement personnel to the
payroll, the Government gets inside information from the relators and is only
responsible for paying them if the action is successful. The relator gets the
chance to help the Government recoup taxpayer money that has been taken by
fraud and also receives a substantial payout with protection against employer
retaliation.6 1 The statute also protects defendants against frivolous law suits
by forcing the plaintiff to pay the expenses and costs of the defendant if the
court considers the lawsuit frivolous and by keeping the filing of the claim
under seal until the Government has a chance to investigate. 62
IV. SPECIFIC PARTS OF THE NEW AMENDMENTS THAT ENCOURAGE RELATORS
As discussed in the history section, supra, the qui tam provision evolved from
a broad cause of action allowing virtually anybody to bring a claim, and if
successful receive fifty percent of the recovery, to a very narrow, virtually
unused provision with a limited recovery thatwas in most cases not financially
worthwhile.63 Now, after the 1986 amendments, the provision is a compromise
between the two extremes making it easier to bring a cause of action if the
person has original information that can actually help the Government while
still avoiding parasitic lawsuits. 64
Under the 1943 amendments the relator could recover up to ten percent-but
was guaranteed nothing even if the suit was successful. The 1986 amendments
guarantee a minimum of fifteen percent (plus attorneys' fees) if the case is
successful. 65 This larger guarantee, if the case succeeds, makes the risk much
more financially worthwhile.
The 1943 version also had a strict jurisdictional bar. Congress wanted to
discourage the parasitic lawsuits in which the plaintiff got to share in the
Government's recovery when all the plaintiff did was copy the information off
a Government indictment as in Marcus v. Hess.66 Under the 1943 version,
relators were denied jurisdiction if the Government had any information about
the fraud alleged in the suit, even if the Government had undertaken no
investigation or prosecution. 67 In the post-1986 version, the jurisdictional
restrictions were relaxed. Now jurisdiction is only barred when a Government

60§ 3730(c)(i)-(c)(3).
61§ 3730.
62§ 3730(b)(2), (d)(4).
63
The 1943 amendments significantly narrowed the cause of action and "weakened
the effectiveness for the qui tam legislation." Broody, supra note 16, at 593.
64

See Phillips, supra note 25, at 268-69.
6531 U.S.C.S. § 3730 (d)(1)-(2) (Law. Co-op. 1993).
66

See Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).

67

See Phillips, supra note 25, at 271.
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investigation is already underway and has been publicly disclosed and if the
qui tam plaintiff is not an original source of the information. 68
The qui tam plaintiff, under the new amendments may remain a party to the
case even if the Government intervenes. 69 Additionally, the qui tam plaintiff
may even object to a settlement proposed by the Government. 70 This is in
contrast with the old law, whereby if the Government joined the action, the
plaintiff could no longer play an active role in the lawsuit. 71
The new amendments allow reasonable attorneys' fees paid by the relator
based upon hours reasonably spent in addition to the percentage of the
recovery the attorney and client have already agreed upon.72 This is important
in the area of Medicare/Medicaid fraud because some of the potential
recoveries are small. Without provisions for the payment of attorneys' fees, it
may be too expensive for many qui tam plaintiffs to file small, but otherwise
meritorious claims. 73
The new amendments offer whistleblower protection. 74 While the old law
depended on the law of the state in which the suit was brought, the new
amendments provide a federal standard that will deter employers from
75
retaliating against qui tam plaintiffs.
The new, relator-friendly amendments are a significant contribution to the
False Claims Act. The benefits are structured to allow expansion into areas of
Government spending beyond those that are defense-related. The law that has
haunted defense contractors since it was enacted in 1863 has now begun to
make its mark in the health care industry, where the Government spends a great
deal of money in the funding of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 76 "The
government believes that an estimated 3 percent to 5 percent of domestic health
care expenditures--$738 billion in 1991--don't pay for actual or necessary care
but instead are lost to health care fraud. " 77 The changes to the law have made
it much easier and very profitable for plaintiffs with knowledge of fraud in the
health care area to report their knowledge to the Government. Since these

68

1d.

69§ 3730(c)(1).
70
7

See Phillips, supra note 25, at 271.

lid.

72§ 3730(d)(1)-(2)(1993). See also Phillips, supra note 25, at 271.
73

See Phillips, supra note 25, at 271.

74§ 3730(h).
75

See Phillips, supra note 25, at 271.

76

"As the federal government rolls out the big guns against health-care fraud,
health-care providers will begin to understand how defense contractors have felt over

the past few years-as targets of the civil False Claims Act." Vogel, supranote 42, at 13.
77
See Richard A. Feinstein et al, Surgical Strikes on Health Abuses, THE RECORDER Dec.
15,1992 at 8.
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amendments were instituted, the number of qui tam suits in the area of health
care increased from 2 in 1987 to 22 in 1992.78
V. AREAS WHERE QuI TAM ACTIONS ARE LIKELY TO OCCUR IN
MEDICARE/MEDICAID

Health care fraud most often occurs in the areas of false billing and
overutilization. 79 False billing occurs in a variety of ways such as billing for
services never provided; charging for more expensive services than were
provided;8 0 private insurers charging Medicare/Medicaid when the patient
was actually covered primarily by the private insurer 1 charging patients who
received outpatient treatment or tests as if they had received inpatient services
or tests because Medicare/Medicaid pays more for inpatient treatment;82 and
faulty computer systems that either intentionally or accidentally overbill. 83
Overutilization occurs when unnecessary tests and services are ordered. 84
Sometimes this happens in the form of multiple tests being ordered when one
test would have provided the necessary diagnostic information, but extras
were ordered because of the profit to be made by billing Medicare/Medicaid
for more than one test. Another form of overutilization occurs when surgery is
used before medication has been tried. In some instances the malady never
actually existed. 85 In one recent example, this overutilization went beyond
doctors, practitioners, hospitals and clinics to testing laboratories. The
laboratories designed order forms in a manner that "tricked" doctors into
ordering unnecessary blood tests that only cost the doctors pennies for each
test, but the lab then billed the Government sixteen dollars each for the tests. 86
The majority of the qui tam actions brought against health care providers are
settled quickly and quietly. As previously mentioned, the health care industry
is very sensitive to public opinion. A lawsuit involving fraud by a health care

78John T. Boese, Qui Tam and False Claims Development Beyond ProcurementFraud,in

Qul TAM: BEYOND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac. Series, Course
Handbook Series Number H-456, 1993) at 61.
79

Vogel, supranote 42, at 13.

80

1d. at 14.
See Stinson, 944 F.2d. at 1151.

81
82

David Burda, AHM to pay $500,000 to Settle Dispute,MODERN HEALTHCARE, Apr. 8,
1991 at 32.
83
United States ex rel. Burr v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., No.
91-134-CIV-J-16 (1992 WL 521775 (M.D. Fla. July 9, 1992) (Settlement agreement
executed Aug. 4, 1993 at *1).
84

Feinstein, supra note 77, at 8.
See M. Carroll Thomas, This Doctor Turned in a ColleagueforMedicare Fraud,68 MED.
EcON. 48, at 49-50 (1991).
85

86
Matt Siegel, Big Suits, THE AM. LAW., Nov. 1993, at 94-96; Pamela Wilson, Health
Scams Becoming More Sophisticated,SAN DIEGO DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Mar. 22,1993 at 1A.
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provider against the Government and the taxpayers can be very harmful to the
industry because the general public may lose confidence in the particular
provider, which would be harmful to that provider's business. Additionally,
the cost of litigation is very high. It is probably for these reasons that most of
the cases settle. Included in virtually all of the settlements are a denial of any
guilt and a secrecy clause.
A. Cases
Qui tam actions in relation to Medicare/Medicaid are very uncertain. In
addition to the incentives to settle, jurisdictional bars to action have prevented
many qui tam actions in the area of Medicare/Medicaid from being heard on
their merits. Recall, the jurisdictional bars were added to the qui tam provision
in the 1940's to prevent "parasitic" lawsuits where the relator simply copied
from previously published material and brought an action without providing
any new information. 87 For example, one case that 'became entangled in
questions concerning the relator's eligibility, thus preventing a determination
on the action's merits" was brought by a group of attorneys. 88 They alleged that
it was common practice in the insurance industry to allow Medicare to pay as
the primary provider for working senior citizens who were actually covered
under their employer's health plans.8 9 The plaintiffs learned of this alleged
practice during a deposition of Provident Insurance Co. while representing an
employed senior citizen in a personal injury case. 90 In the course of discovery,
the plaintiffs obtained two Provident memoranda which suggested that other
insurance companies had similar claim processing practices. They brought a
qui tam action against Provident and five other insurance companies. 91 Inthe
Prudential case, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
dismissed the case finding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction. 92 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling, holding that information
obtained during a deposition is information that "came out in a public hearing,"
thus falling under one of the jurisdictional bars in the False Claims Act. 93
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The jurisdictional bar was used to dismiss another case before getting to its
merits. The plaintiff was a patient who suspected that he had been subjected
to unnecessary surgery which was paid for by Medicare. 94 He had seen a story
about the clinic at which he had been a patient on a news broadcast alleging
that the clinic was frequently performing the same unnecessary surgery on
other Medicare recipients. 95 The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss
the class claims based on the jurisdictional bar which denies qui tam plaintiffs
jurisdiction when the action is based on "public disclosure of allegations.. . in
(a report from) the media ...."96 His information, according to the court, came
97
primarily from what he learned from watching a newscast.
B. The Impact of Settlements
Judging from the cases, qui tam actions do not appear to have had much
impact in the area of health care. However, one must look beyond the case law
to find the true impact of qui tam litigation in the area of Medicare/Medicaid.
As discussed previously, there are great incentives for defendants in the health
care field to settle cases quickly and anonymously before they are harmed by
the deterioration of public opinion which would accompany a dramatic
lawsuit brought against them.
Hospitals, doctors, insurance companies and medical laboratories have all
paid out large settlements in qui tam cases. According to recent reports, Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, 98 National Health Labs 99 and Sacred Heart
Hospital 0 0 have all settled lawsuits with the Government. Each concerned
unrelated incidents, with the allegations in each complaint accusing each
company of presenting false claims to the Government for payment through
Medicare or Medicaid. Although none admitted to any violation of the law,
they paid $10 million,101 $110 million, 102 and $3.25 million respectively.103

94

Robbins v. Desnick, No. 90C 2371, 1991 WL 5829 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 15,1991).
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1991 at 32.
101 Burr, 1992 WL 521775 at *2.
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These settlements have not been widely publicized because the settlement
agreements also included secrecy stipulations10 4 In each of these cases a qui
tam plaintiff was awarded a substantial amount of the settlement:
approximately $2.5 million went to the plaintiffs from Florida Blue Cross,10 5
$23 million from National Health LabsY° 6 and $650,000 from Sacred Heart
Hospital. 107
All of these settlements occured after the 1986 amendments to the False
Claims Act. Each of the relators was employed in the industry and had personal
information concerning the alleged fraudulent claims that the defendants
submitted to the Government. These examples suggest that Congress is seeing
some success in reaching its goal of creating an incentive for those "within the
web of silence" to come forward with information. Although the high number
of settlements keeps the courts from interpreting the statute and thereby
presenting clear rules of law, it cannot be denied that qui tam actions have the
potential to greatly influence the health care industry. The number of qui tam
cases continues to grow.108 If cases consistently settle for high dollar amounts,
more attorneys and bigger law firms will be attracted to this type of lawsuit.
The qui tam provision of the False Claims Act is in a position to play a significant
role in changing our health care system.
VI. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM RESULTING FROM
INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY TO THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT THROUGH THE QLI TAM
PROVISION

A. Positive Effects
1. The Effect on Fraudulent Billing
Qui tam litigation is a way to ensure that Government money intended for
health care will actually be spent on health care. One way to achieve this goal
is to stop fraudulent billing practices. Complicated schemes defrauding the
Government have evolved that are not easily detected by Government
10 4

Modern Healthcare petitioned the Inspector General for copies of the civil
monetary settlements reached with hospitals from October 1983 through January 1991.
The request generated forty-three agreements. By settling, the hospitals do not admit

wrong doing. According to the article, "[flew of the 43 settlements have received any
measure of publicity, and one reason for the secrecy is the inclusion of confidentiality
clauses in the agreements." Twenty-five of the forty-three settlements reviewed by
Modem Healthcare had provisions that bar the Government from publicizing the
agreements. Typically, the clauses prohibit the Government from issuing a press release
or commenting on anything other than what is included in the settlement agreement.
Burda, supra note 100, at 32.
105
Burr, 1992 WL 521775 at "11.

1061d.
10 7
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inspectors. By allowing others to bring qui tam actions, the Government is able
to specifically enlist the help of those working within the industry. Qui tam
actions provide increased incentives for potential relators to come forward and
also provide relators protection by retaliation from their employers.
This was illustrated in a qui tam action that was brought in California against
American Healthcare Management.1 09 The action was brought by a former
employee at Linda Vista Community Hospital in Los Angeles against the
hospital and one of its physicians, Dr. Pablo Nankin.110 According to the
complaint, the hospital billed Medicare for outpatient cardiovascular tests at
the hospital when they were actually performed at mobile clinics owned by Dr.
Nankin. 111 A profit was made under this arrangement because Medicare pays
more for outpatient tests done in the hospital than at the clinics because
2
hospitals have higher overhead.11
Another example of a qui tam action used to halt a complex scheme of
fraudulent billing was a case brought in Florida against Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Florida, Inc. [hereinafter BCBSF] by a former employee of BCBSF.113 The
employee was familiar with BCBSF's billing practices and, according to her,
BCBSF took advantage of the fact that it was having difficulties installing a new
computer system that processed Medicare Part B claims. 114 The employee
alleged that since the system was not fully developed it was not capable of
processing the claims and that BCBSF knowingly concealed the deficiencies in
its system and used it to defraud the Medicare program.11 5 The alleged scam
included billing for claims that were never processed, bypassing or overriding
inquiries in the system regarding eligibility, coverage, payment, duplicate
claims and overutilization, causing ineligible claims to be paid. 116 The
allegations also included recycling previously processed claims in order to hide
the backlog and to falsely inflate payment to BCBSE117 Because of this
fraudulent billing scheme, the Government was forced to pay legitimate
claims late, with interest.118 The backlog required the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) to approve advances of Medicare funds to physicians,
vendors and other health care suppliers who accepted assignment on Medicare
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claims. 119 This placed the providers in financial jeopardy as a result of the lack
120
of timely and accurate processing of Medicare claims.
Often, schemes of this complexity could only be detected by employees or
individuals working within a system who have knowledge of its operations.
Before the 1986 amendments to the qui tam provision of the FCA, there was
little incentive for these people to come forward even if they had a strong cause
of action. Since the 1986 amendments, plaintiffs in cases such as these have had
a forum and an incentive. The BCBSF case settled for $10 million. American
Healthcare Management settled for $500,000 and Dr. Nankin settled for
$875,000.121 All of the parties denied any violation of federal law.122 In each
case, the plaintiffs a substantial recovery.123 Because the Government is
recovering millions from people who have tried to defraud it, the threat of a
FCA suit that may be brought by anybody (competitors, current and previous
employees or patients) will be an effective deterrent against greed-motivated
individuals who may be tempted to submit fraudulent claims.
This deterrent goes beyond those with fraudulent intent. It encourages
everyone in the industry submitting claims to the Government to actively look
for mistakes that overcharge the Government in their systems. This point is
illustrated by a qui tam action that was brought against Sacred Heart Hospital
in California. 124 According to the allegations of the relator, a former director of
quality assurance and interim administrator, the hospital had errors in its
computer codes that "switched the codes for patients' principal and secondary
diagnoses," causing the hospital to bill Medicare for more costly procedures
which resulted in charging Medicare about $900,000 more than it should have
been charged.1 25 Sacred Heart, a charity hospital with a tradition of caring for
migrant farm workers, prisoners and the indigent, claimed that this was a
mistake; the overbilling a result of a faulty system and inexperienced
employees. 126 Sacred Heart settled for $3.5 million with the relator receiving
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121 Burda, supra note 82, at 32.
122 "It is expressly understood and agreed between the parties that this Settlement
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$650,000 (20 percent).127 Sacred Heart vehemently denied any intent to commit
fraud but claimed that litigation would have cost far more than the
128
settlement.
Regardless of intent (or lack thereof) this case should serve as a warning to
all health care providers to review their procedures, work out any "bugs" and
see that the procedures for which Medicare is being billed have actually been
provided and in a reasonable manner. This is an area in which the 1986
amendments give the statute significant power because of its liberal knowledge
requirement. 129 The 1943 version required actual knowledge. The current
version only requires that either there be actual knowledge or reckless
disregard for truthfulness or falsity.13 0 In a case like this, the knowledge
requirement spreads the responsibility throughout the hospital to anyone who
has failed to take accurate measures to detect falsity. Therefore, the
responsibility ranges from the data entry clerk processing the claims to the top
administrative officials to attempt to actively detect fraud and correct it.13 1
The present qui tam action is a powerful vehicle for detecting fraudulent
billing and recouping the money that has been fraudulently billed.
Additionally, it deters others in the industry from attempting fraudulent
schemes and encourages everyone submitting claims to the Government to
review their systems to ensure that they are not falsely billing the Government
by accident. The end result is that money that was intended to provide health
care for those who cannot afford it is actually going to its intended purpose.
2. The Effect on Overutilization
Perhaps even more harmful and certainly more inhumane than false billing,
where money is taken for services not provided, is overutilization.
Overutilization occurs when patients undergo tests and treatments that are
medically unnecessary so that unscrupulous providers make a profit. The
improved accessibility of qui tam actions may help decrease these practices. An
example of this is exhibited in a case where a qui tam action was brought against
the Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation in La Jolla, California, and one of its
doctors for performing unnecessary surgery on Medicare recipients.132 The
relator in the action was an opthalmologist at the clinic, Dr. Paul Michelson. 133
He suspected that another opthalmologist was doing unnecessary surgery and
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cheating Medicare after noticing the high rate of surgeries performed by a
colleague on new patients when it was standard practice to try to treat the eye
problems with drugs first.134 The relator went to his supervisors and when
nothing happened, he spoke up repeatedly and eventually was fired.135 He
considered reporting the practices to various state medical boards and
Medicare authorities but was afraid nothing would be done.136 He feared this
would expose him to a defamation or restraint of trade suit. 137 He was
searching for a safe, effective way to proceed against both his former employer
and his colleague when he;
happened upon a September 17, 1986, newspaper account of recent
amendments to the False Claims Act ....
It allowed "whistleblowers"
to bring suit on their own and collect a small portion of whatever was
returned to the government ....
The report said nothing about
Medicare fraud, dwelling instead on the sins of defense contractors
138
and how the 1986 amendments would make it easier to nail them.
Michelson filed a complaint, which alleged that the doctor and the clinic
were profiting from performing "laser procedures for glaucoma on patients
who either hadn't been diagnosed as having the condition or hadn't been
treated conservatively first" and subjecting patients to experimental, unusual
or dangerous procedures not approved by Medicare, then billing for expensive
reimbursable operations. 139 The case settled in April, 1988, when Scripps
agreed to pay $355,000 plus $100,000 in attorney's fees, and the doctor paid
$250,000 plus $75,000 in attorney's fees. 140 Michelson and Co-plaintiff
Taxpayers Against Fraud recovered twenty percent.141 As a result of a qui tam
action, this inhumane practice has been halted in at least one large facility and
is hopefully serving as a deterrent in others. This case also suggests that there
may be more plaintiffs out there who simply need to hear that there is a cause
of action of this sort. As a result of the publicity generated by this case John
Phillips, Michelson's attorney, has said, "we're hearing from nurses, doctors,
and others who have their own allegations of fraud."142
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Another example of a qui tam action being used to put an end to
overutilization can be found in the complaint brought against National Health
Laboratories [hereinafter NHL]. 143 According to reports, this is the largest qui
tam action in history.44 The fraud was detected by a former sales manager at
145
Tarzana, California-based affiliate of MetWest (a competitor of NHL). NHL
revised blood-screen order forms and price structures in the 1980's so that146a
blood cholesterol screen was added to the list of frequently ordered tests.
The format of the request form misled doctors into ordering unnecessary tests;
the doctors were only charged pennies for the additional tests, while the
Government was billed $16 extra for each additional test.147 Requests for the
tests for cholesterol and Ferrital "multiplied about 60 times, from $500,000 in
48
orders in 1980 to $31 Million in 1990. Profits at NHL ballooned accordingly."1
Also named as defendants were two other medical testing laboratories:
49
MetPath, a division of Coming Laboratories and MetWest (UniLab corp).1
Without admitting guilt, they settled for $35 million and $5.226 million
respectively in 1993.150 The relator filed a qui tam action which the government
never formally joined. He received a total of $23 million.1 51 Following the
settlement,
NHL announced that . . . [I]t would distribute new forms to its
customers to facilitate the ordering of the Heath Survey profile without
the Ferritin or cholesterol tests. It also adopted a new compliance
program to ensure that its sales and marketing practices were
1 52
compatible with the government's interpretation of the regulations.
The amended qui tam provision has created a forum for plaintiffs to come
forward. Dr. Michelson, the relator in Scripps, testified before Congress that the
current statutory guarantees of being able to retain his own counsel, a 60 day
sealed Department of Justice investigation and the promise that he would be
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able to participate fully in the litigation from start to finish gave him the
confidence and assurance to come forward with his claim.15 3 These changes
will redirect Medicare/Medicaid money, private insurance money and patients
money out of the pockets of the medical labs and back to the American citizens
for whom the monies were originally intended.
3. The Impact on the Quality of Health Care
A next logical step is that qui tam lawsuits can be used to establish health care
quality "floor".154 If the quality of health care provided is so poor that signing
a claim for reimbursement can be considered a false claim, the provider should
be reachable under the Act. 155 The FCA can be used by patients, families of
patients, social workers, nursing homes, clinics, hospitals and other providers
to assure an adherence to acceptable levels of quality being paid for by
Medicare/Medicaid. This goes farther than simply making sure that money
intended for health care is actually going for health care, it is a way of seeing
to it that the Government is getting its money's worth within the health care
field.
4. Qui tam in relation to Malpractice
A combination of two types of litigation, qui tam and medical malpractice,
may operate as a vehicle to drive the health care industry toward the social,
political and economic ideal of high quality health care at reasonable prices.
Malpractice litigation can be considered an assuror of quality health care with
the threat of a malpractice lawsuit as a deterrent from falling below acceptable
standards of care. 156 However, there are at least two major problems that keep
malpractice from assuring the aforementioned ideal.157 First, a malpractice
action depends on damages, which is not always a true measure of the care
provided.158 Poor quality of care may be provided, but if there are no significant
damages, there is no malpractice recovery. This waters down the deterrence
factor. If the provider is lucky and the low quality of care has no long term
effects, the threat of malpractice litigation effectively disappears. Second, threat
of malpractice litigation tends to drive up health care costs. 159 As the defensive
15 3
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medicine argument suggests, health care providers may tend to overprescribe,
overtest or overtreat to isolate themselves from a malpractice action.
The False Claims Act, made more accessible to plaintiffs through qui tam,
deals with both of these problems. First, it is not dependent upon the outcome
(damages). Instead, it is dependent upon the quality of care itself, since the
cause of action arises out of the fact that the provider signed the forms
requesting reimbursement for a particular type of care provided. 160 If this care
was of such a poor quality that the request can be seen as a false claim, a qui
tam lawsuit may provide an additional recovery (and deterrent) to complement
the recovery and deterrence provided by malpractice. As for malpractice's
tendency to drive up health care costs and force over-treatment, the FCA
addresses this also. The threat of a false claims/qui tam lawsuit encourages the
opposite type of defensive medicine-undertreatment. While neither type of
defensive medicine is by itself desirable, the combination of the two set outer
boundaries for health care providers. Both causes of action encourage a high
quality of care, malpractice based on the outcome of the treatment, qui tam
based on the level of quality provided. Malpractice encourages overtreatment,
false claims encourages undertreatment. The duo may help to bring us closer
to our current national goal, quality health care at reasonable prices.
B. Negative Effects
These "boundaries" appear to be much needed in as much as the health care
situation has been declared a crisis in the United States. However, those in the
health care industry may not see it this way. False claims litigation may be seen
as the removal of the malpractice safety net because of its penalties for
prescribing too many tests and extensive treatment. This could be a hard blow
to an industry already heavily burdened with malpractice insurance
premiums. It is easy for a court to find that a particular test or procedure was
unnecessary when there has been time to review the situation and ponder the
circumstances in hindsight, but many times the decisions are made in
emergency situations under circumstances in which the utility of the test or
treatment is not as clear.
Qui tam "actions" may apply too much pressure on providers by tending to
shrink what may be seen as an already narrow zone of safe practice into an
unintelligible line.161 It may force good practitioners to practice a new kind of
"defensive medicine" through underutilization. 162 A prime example of this is
inpatient psychiatric care,
currently under intense government scrutiny, partially because of lost
credibility and the intangible nature of ailments and treatments and
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the negative press recently surrounding the psychiatric care system in
general, insurers have begun to reduce psychiatric benefits and
increase demand rates. As a result many psychiatric hospitals
believe
T63
that on average, patients are being discharged too early.
These factors create a disincentive for treating Medicare/Medicaid patients.
Thus, qui tam litigation may arguably actually harm those it was intended to
protect.
Another way qui tam could serve to harm the very people it intends to protect
is illustrated in the Sacred Heart Hospital case. 164 The final chapter to this story
is that after the FCA/qui tam settlement, the hospital was no longer able to
operate as a non-profit institution and was sold. It became a for-profit hospital
with no guarantee that it would continue to do any charity work. 165 Thus, a
charity hospital with the same goals as the Medicare/Medicaid program (to
provide health care for those with no other means of affording it) was
effectively put out of business under the auspices of furthering
Medicare/Medicaid.
Despite these potential negative effects, under a cost/benefit analysis this
harm may be of limited significance on a large, national scale. The loss is one
charity hospital, an "admittedly poorly managed hospital."166 On the positive
side, all charity and small hospitals have received a wake-up call. They have
all been alerted to the necessity of going over their systems, making sure that
there are no mistakes that may be cheating the government, and scrutinizing
questionable practices to correct them before they come to the government's
attention. The overall good qui tam actions will do in potentially saving the
government hundreds of millions of dollars in Medicare/Medicaid payments
easily outweighs the loss of a very few poorly run, poorly managed "charitable"
institutions.
Although the negative factors of the qui tam provision of the False Claims
Act create a possible threat to some in the health care industry, it is a necessary
threat. If estimates on the amount of fraud in the health care industry are
anywhere near accurate, a powerful method of prevention is imperative.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recipients of Medicare/Medicaid are dependent on these programs for
healthcare that they would not otherwise be able to afford. As cuts to these
programs are currently being proposed, many people in need of medical care
will have to go without this care. Meanwhile the defendants discussed in this
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article have realized extreme, unearned profits by fraudulently billing
Medicare and Medicaid programs.
The qui tam provision of the False Claims Act has been and should continue
to be, used to curtail these fraudulent practices of false billing and
overutilization. The act has potential to provide an additional service to the
public by influencing the quality of care provided to Medicare and Medicaid
recipients.
As this article notes, some negative effects may result from use of qui tam
actions to combat fraud in the health care industry. However, there is also a
serious need for detection and prevention of government fraud. Fraud
detection is necessary in order to assure that money intended to provide
healthcare to those who cannot afford it actually goes to those in need, instead
of the pockets of individuals such as the defendants discussed in this article
and other individuals committing fraud on the government who have gone
undetected.
The qui tam provision of the False Claims Act, cause of action drafted by
President Lincoln with the intention of stopping Civil War defense contractors
from bilking the Government by selling shells filled with sawdust instead of
gunpowder, with its current revisions and amendments, is now being used to
call attention to fraudulent practices in the health care industry against the U.S.
Government. The qui tam provision of the False Claims Act is in a position to
safeguard against Medicare and Medicaid abuse and influence the quality of
healthcare in the United States.
Carolyn J. Paschke

